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SCIENTISTS

TAKE CHARGE: SCIENCE, POLICY, AND THE SPOTTED OWL

ABSTRACT
In 1992, the Forest Service adopted a new operating policy, Ecosystem
Management, which minimized the agency’s timber production goals in favor of
a more ecologically balanced view of its responsibilities. In explaining this shift,
scholars have dismissed the possibility of internal reform, arguing that the
Service could not change without irresistible external pressure from environmental activists and new public values supporting biodiversity. Viewing the
Service’s shift through the lens of the spotted owl controversy, however, demonstrates the important role agency culture played in instigating bureaucratic
change. The Service’s evolution stemmed from the rising influence of its scientists in policy formation. Their research in support of protecting the owl and the
biodiversity of old-growth forests thrived in an agency that nurtured scientific
independence, and it thrust them into leadership positions. Forest Service
science legitimized the arguments of environmentalists and crystallized public
values favoring biodiversity into a new policy.

THE FOREST SERVICE would never be the same. Jack Ward Thomas knew that.
By 1992, the lead scientist in the effort to protect the Northern Spotted Owl had
been working for three years crafting plans to save the threatened bird. Now, he
realized, he and his team of biologists had done much more than that; they had
undone the storied mission of the Service to harvest timber, to “get the cut out.”
His forester bosses were not in charge. He was. The timber industry could only
cut timber by his leave. “Scientists,” he surmised, “have now obtained power.”1
The following year, Thomas himself obtained formal power, becoming the first
biologist appointed Chief of the Forest Service (1993-1996).
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Scientists involved in the spotted owl controversy helped remake the Forest
Service, leading to its adoption of a new operating philosophy. Ecosystem
Management, as defined by the Service, was an “ecological approach to
achieve the multiple-use management of national forests and grasslands by
blending the needs of people and environmental values in such a way that
national forests and grasslands represent diverse, healthy, productive and sustainable ecosystems.” Ecosystem Management ended the agency’s mission to
maximize timber production in favor of a more ecologically balanced view of
its responsibilities.2
In explaining the rise of Ecosystem Management and similar initiatives,
Samuel Hays emphasized the importance of national value trends toward
environmental amenities. Ecological forestry, he argued, emerged inevitably
from these new values. The owl controversy was just one regional manifestation
of it. Hays correctly stressed the overarching importance of society’s value
shifts, but his analysis overlooks internal agency dynamics that might
explain why some agencies embraced Ecosystem Management while others
lagged. It also misses the formative influence of the owl controversy in crystallizing agency support for ecosystem management before there was a
groundswell of opinion for such a policy.3 As Thomas argued, the spotted owl
controversy took “the lid off of the whole greater issue as to what … we
want[ed] our national forest managed for.”4
Hays is not alone in stressing external forces to explain agency change. Many
scholarly accounts of Ecosystem Management’s origins credit the tactics of the
environmental movement. These analyses claim that the tradition-bound,
production-oriented Forest Service formulated Ecosystem Management as a desperate ploy during the spotted owl controversy to retain control over its forest
lands while changing as little as possible. The agency had to be shackled and
dragged to the policy by environmentalists through court orders.5 Obviously
the environmental movement played a pivotal role in the last half of the
spotted owl controversy, but it was barely visible in the 1970s and early 1980s
when the Service’s institutional culture was undergoing substantial change.
Policy experts who highlight the internal dynamics of bureaucratic change
see little influence from scientists. They explain that in a pluralistic political
culture government agencies respond to their own interests and political
pressure. Scientists, whose studies are often riddled with inconclusive results,
have only limited influence in shaping the debate. This uncertainty and the fragmentation of power created by the multiple agencies, laws, and interest groups
allow bureaucrats to “justify whatever direction they want to set.”6 Scientists,
who are often disinclined to compromise, are largely shut out of final decisions
and are relegated to being providers of information, information that is often
ignored.7 Litigation is usually necessary to alter bureaucratic behavior.
That was not the case in this story. “From inside the Forest Service,” one of its
lead biologists argued, “most of [the owl controversy and agency behavior] was
driven by science.”8 Often uncomfortable with their leading role as policy
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makers, scientists nevertheless wielded enormous influence because only they
had the reputation and expertise to solve the agency’s management and political problems in adapting to new environmental values. They wrote the critical
regulations regarding wildlife and timber policy, served on forest planning
teams, did the research that narrowed executive options to a few very unpleasant choices, represented the Service in court and in Congress, drew up the
Ecosystem Management plans, and assumed key leadership positions, including Forest Service Chief. Their research helped shift public opinion to value biodiversity and the preservation of ecosystems rather than the preservation of a
few charismatic species such as the spotted owl.9
The reason for this outsized role for scientists is clear. Their reputable
science and a long-standing favorable climate in the agency toward science dictated policy change as much as any of the external influences on the agency.
The Forest Service was receptive to a science-informed policy and sponsored
the scientific research that led to it. Much has been made of the intense conflict
between the Service’s wildlife scientists and its traditional forestry agenda.
Less ink has been devoted to the Service’s commitment to scientific research
and the autonomy it granted its scientists. It was the Service’s historical emphasis on expertise and adaptability that made this change possible. Early on, the
Forest Service established experimental stations and sponsored academic
research.10 The agency was, perhaps, a “timber beast” in the postwar period,
but its support of independent science and the deference it gave to its scientists
laid the basis for its dramatic shift in priorities. The agency funded extensive
spotted owl studies, hired scores of wildlife biologists and ecologists, and
took most, if not all, of their advice in creating enormous old-growth-habitat
reserves in the Pacific Northwest.
As scientific research justified preserving diverse species and public
concern led to endangered species protection, the Service broadened its wildlife
expertise beyond its traditional concern with game animals. This infusion of
new personnel with different perspectives than the agency’s foresters encouraged the Service to manage its lands to increase biodiversity, rather than
timber harvests. Agencies such as the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and
the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) that did not have this tradition of scientific independence were more susceptible to direct political interference in this
controversy.
The scientists did not do this alone, of course. The environmental movement
was an essential component in transforming the Service, but in a broader sense
than is often portrayed. It enabled government scientists by winning passage of
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and Endangered Species Act
(ESA). Together these acts mandated scientific input on environmental
impact statements and determinations of endangered species status. Through
the National Forest Management Act (NFMA) of 1976, the movement helped
establish a forest management system that valued public input, interdisciplinary science, and ecological diversity.11 It then policed that system through
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litigation and effective lobbying that neutralized industry clout with the Service
and in Congress.
Within this new resource-management regime, however, much change came
from inside the Service as foresters and scientists debated and learned to
accommodate each other. Thomas Dunlap observed that “[historians] have too
often characterized ‘government’ as an inert lump that must be moved by
(usually high-minded and pure-souled) conservation organizations.” Too little
attention is given to how agencies adapt to new values, laws, scientific information, and the infusion of a more diverse professional staff.12 All of these
factors had a profound influence on the Service’s evolution.
Many dispute that the Service underwent significant change of its own
accord in the 1970s and 1980s. Logs and lumber mills seemed to win out over
wildlife. At times during the controversy, this was true, as the Service tried in
1984 and 1988 to opt for less than what its scientists recommended was the
minimum needed to save the spotted owl. But the Service’s attempt to
balance those recommendations with its multiple-use mission was hardly surprising. The stakes were enormous: tens of thousands of jobs, billions of
board feet, billions of dollars. The Service’s mission was turned inside-out in
a little more than a decade. It was more change than a bureaucracy could do
well or quickly. When the Service faltered, environmental lawsuits and court
orders forced it to complete its transformation to ecosystem management. In
the end, then, two groups mattered most: judges and scientists.
The spotted owl controversy indicates that the Forest Service’s move toward
Ecosystem Management was not an inevitable result of new public values,
external interest group pressure, or bureaucratic self-interest. By giving scientists and science their due, a more complete story emerges. Environmentalists
and their values could only win this one with help on the inside. It came from
respected scientific authority within a science-friendly agency that legitimized
and crystallized public values favoring biodiversity into a new policy.
IN THE SUMMER 1968, Eric Forsman, biology major at Oregon State
University, was working a summer job as a Forest Service fire guard at Box
Canyon in Oregon’s Willamette National Forest. It was a great job for him
because he loved the outdoors. He had grown up on an old strawberry farm
near Eugene, spending his free time hunting and trapping game. By his
teens, his hunting had turned into a fascination with birds. “Owls really intrigued me,” he recalled. He once dragged his biology professor to a Great
Horned Owl nest he had located. When he climbed the tree, the female struck
with the force of a “medicine ball.” He descended stunned with blood running
down his neck. “I thought it was just great.”13
Forsman spent his free time at the station looking for owls, especially the
Northern Spotted Owl. At that time, seeing a spotted owl was about as common
as a reported sighting of Big Foot. One evening he heard what sounded like a
dog barking in the meadow near the station, but no dog appeared. What happened
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Figure 1. Reclusive yet Fearless.

Photos courtesy Dale X. Phipps.

The spotted owl’s lack of fear around humans made them relatively easy to track, study, and
tag, leading to Eric Forsman’s path-breaking research on the species. This female and her chick
(Figure 2) were photographed from just ten feet away in the Naches Ranger District of
Wenatchee National Forest in 2009.

next changed his life. He tried an owl hoot. A spotted owl pair swooped down to
defend their territory, one perching just a few feet away from Forsman. The
owl’s lack of fear of humans was profoundly moving. “I’ve never seen anyone
who isn’t affected by their first interaction” with the spotted owl, he noted. “For
me it’s like going to church.”14
Having found his religion, Forsman began his graduate work in 1972, studying the spotted owl at Oregon State University (OSU). He was already the foremost expert on the owl—there was no one else. He even kept a female owl as a pet
in his back yard, named Fat Broad by the wife of one of his friends after the B.C.
comic character because the owl ate like crazy. From his observations, he knew
that spotted owls strongly preferred old growth forests to second growth. But
more rigorous study was necessary. The best place to go for research funds
was the Forest Service’s Cooperative Wildlife Research Unit in La Grande,
Oregon. Jack Ward Thomas, the lead research biologist at the station, had
some “year-end money” that he dangled in front of Forsman’s OSU mentor
Howard Wight. Wight funneled the money to Forsman’s owl research.
Studying a nongame species was a bit of a departure for the Forest Service,
and Thomas joked to Wight about the owl, “What’s the bag limit on those
damn things?” “We were not doing a lot of research about tweety birds and
hoot owls,” Thomas recalled. “Most of our stuff was on [game species like]
elk and deer.” Nevertheless, the Service offered Forsman the grant even
though his research proposal clearly detailed the danger that old-growth harvests posed to the owl and his stated aim was to restrict logging.15 Even as
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Figure 2. Reclusive yet Fearless.

Photos courtesy Dale X. Phipps.

Spotted owl chick, photographed from just ten feet away in the Naches Ranger District of
Wenatchee National Forest in 2009.

his research came to increasingly dire conclusions about the owl’s habitat
needs, the Forest Service continued without objection to fund Forsman
through his doctoral research.
Despite Thomas’s joke about bag limits, the public and the Service were
taking greater interest in the science of nongame wildlife. Forsman’s funding
was just one example of those changing priorities.16 The ESA of 1973, and the
earlier versions of it, along with the National Forest Management Act of 1976
gave new responsibilities to state and federal wildlife agencies to preserve
habitat for rare species and ecological diversity. NEPA’s Environmental
Impact Statements (EIS) required interdisciplinary teams. Biologists were in
high demand. State agencies were traditionally responsible for game management and began hiring them for nongame species. Charlie Bruce, who
became intimately involved in the owl controversy, started his career as
Oregon’s first nongame bird biologist. His colleagues teased him as the
“dickey bird guy” who studied small unimportant species, but he was just the
first of many.17 Similarly, the Forest Service hired scores of “ologists” as

THE DICKEY BIRD SCIENTISTS TAKE CHARGE

|

Figure 3. Eric Forsman and Fat Broad.

Photo courtesy Eric Forsman.

Pictured here in 1973 with Eric Forsman, Fat Broad was adopted by the scientist when she was
young and became quite attached to humans. Forsman took the owl on countless exhibitions to
schools and other public functions in Oregon evangelizing about the plight of her species.

foresters recognized that their own expertise was not sufficient. Jim Lyon, an
early wildlife biologist hire, recalled that by the 1970s the demand for biologists
outstripped supply. Soon the biologists “started taking over the Forest
Service.”18 By the late 1980s, staff science positions increased from 284 to
688 wildlife biologists, 75 to 236 fisheries biologists, 47 to 206 archeologists,
and 7 to 84 ecologists.19
This resulted in a clash of cultures between foresters and the new hires, a
clash the “ologists” eventually won. As Regional Supervisor Jeff Sirmon
noted, these new “experts didn’t have the kind of allegiance to the organization
that the traditional forestry recruit had, and the organization found it very difficult to accommodate conflicting perspectives within the agency.” The term
“combat biologist,” meant either as an insult or worn as a badge of honor, epitomized the tension. Nevertheless, Dale Robertson, Forest Service Chief
(1987-1993), concluded that with the hiring of scientists “we were planting
the seeds for the destruction of the multiple use management concept.”
Those who challenged the ethic that “timber was king” felt unwelcome and
were accused of not being team players, but biologists shook up the agency’s
conventional wisdom.20 For example, the Service’s biologists successfully challenged the forester’s myth that “good timber management is good wildlife management” by demonstrating the essential role old-growth played in the forest
ecosystem.21 Foresters usually cared about game animals that flourished on
the browse that sprouted in a clear-cut and considered old-growth areas biological deserts. Service scientists helped undermine that position and educate the
public to the value of old growth.
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The Service scientists’ success stemmed from the agency’s long-standing
protection of its research division. Since 1915, the Service’s research branch
answered only to the chief to prevent them from being diverted by regional foresters into more immediate problems, and over the years, the chiefs largely protected the research branch from excessive interference. “One of the most
fascinating things about the Forest Service is the integrity of the research division,” Thomas argued. “It is one of the agency’s greatest strengths—and always
has been… . Much of the research that caused the Forest Service its biggest
management pains have come out of its own research division,” as Forsman’s
funding demonstrated.22 As its researchers took greater interest in nongame
species, the Service promoted such study through a series of symposia starting
in 1975. Those who attended the first meeting understood it as “part of the
opening skirmish in … a revolution” in resource management.23
The spotted owl was the early beneficiary of the new attention given to
nongame species. Forsman became an advocate for the spotted owl and drew
these new state and federal agency biologists into his effort to save them. By
the spring of 1973, he had written letters to local officials, agencies, senators,
and environmental organizations.24 With the ESA about to be passed, state
and federal officials knew they needed a better understanding of threatened
species. The Oregon Game Commission created the Oregon Endangered
Species Task Force, an influential advisory committee of mostly wildlife
specialists from state resource agencies, the Service, and the BLM.
The task force started its work in June 1973 and turned immediately to protecting spotted owl habitat. The BLM representative reported the alarming news
that his agency planned to liquidate all of its old growth in less than thirty
years. The Forest Service, he thought, planned on doing the same. Given this
scheduled demise of ancient forests, the task force members asked Forsman
how much old-growth habitat spotted owls needed. Forsman was still three
years from finishing his thesis. Here were the representatives of every major
federal and state resource agency in Oregon asking him what to do. He chose
the low end of the 200 to 1,000 acre range he had recommended to the
Service earlier. Three hundred acres for each pair, he told them. It was hard
for the task force, and even Forsman himself, to imagine two birds needing
much more. They sent the recommendation to the regional heads of the
Forest Service and the BLM.25
It was a hazardous choice for the agencies to take that much old-growth out
of the timber base in a region so dependent on the timber industry. They
rejected the request, confident that further research would show that the owl
needed less habitat. It did not this time. Forsman’s estimate was too low by a
factor of ten. Forest Service biologist Hal Salwasser recalled, “every time
there was a stalling tactic the habitat protection [on the owl] ratcheted up
another notch, till it ratcheted all the way [up].”26
Regardless of the politics involved, the agencies’ decision was not
unreasonable considering the lack of knowledge about the owl. Forsman’s
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three-hundred-acre estimate was half baked, and serious scientific owl studies
were not finished. His 1976 thesis convinced the BLM, Forest Service, and the
endangered species task force to protect four hundred owl pairs with three
hundred acres of old-growth around each nest. Similarly, in response to
Forsman’s 1980 PhD dissertation, the task force successfully recommended
the addition of an optional seven hundred acres to their habitat areas.
Although the few environmentalists who were paying attention to this issue criticized the Service for reserving as little land as possible, that was not the case
in practice. Much to the chagrin of the forest industry, the seven-hundred-acre
“option” often was taken as a minimum requirement for owl habitat by forest
supervisors, especially since research showed that owls needed more
habitat.27 Rather than see the activities of the task force as a hindrance to
its timber mission, the Service’s Region 6 (Oregon and Washington) administrators praised its work, believing that its actions had prevented the listing of the
spotted owl under the ESA.28 With the Service’s blessing, the task force and
Forsman’s research guided the controversy’s trajectory toward greater owl
protection.
The ascendency of the dickey bird scientists did not go unnoticed. That an
unsupervised committee of experts had gained considerable influence over
on-the-ground policy alarmed allies of the timber industry. Officials in the
Oregon State Department of Forestry, a timber-friendly agency, grumbled that
the task force was operating in “quasi-official capacity” and its recommendations were symptomatic of “those who propose to protect flora and fauna
for all time [and] is a movement often unhindered by reason.” The task force
recommendations were, they feared, “only the beginning of anticipated management constraints” carried out “with little other input regarding other
multiple-use impacts.”29 Nonetheless, the task force’s influence continued.
The timber industry and its allies had every reason to worry about the threat
of the spotted owl to logging in the Pacific Northwest. The old growth stands on
federal lands, they hoped, would save an industry that was fast running out of
merchantable trees. The problem dated back to the first half of the century
when the Forest Service was largely a custodian of national forests and sold
little timber given the glut of logs from private lands. The Service withheld
sales until the private supply dried up.30 By the early 1970s, timber companies
had exhausted their holdings, a situation expected to last several decades. After
1945, the Forest Service and BLM filled the gap with its still plentiful supply of
old growth, particularly in Oregon and Washington. The counterintuitive logic
of the timber industry was that a sustained yield of timber was assured not by
logging old growth at a carefully measured pace, but by cutting it down as fast
as possible to allow young rapidly growing trees to replace slow-growing, “decadent” stands of mature timber. The Forest Service would, as the industry did on
its own lands, increase the harvest by actively managing the new growth with
improved tree species, aggressive fertilization, and thinning to maximize
growth rates. With these measures, industry experts predicted that the
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Pacific Northwest would not face a significant dip in timber harvests.31 Only
demands to save old growth for wilderness and wildlife stood in the way. The
industry was already battling the environmental movement on designating
new wilderness areas through the Roadless Area Review Evaluations (RARE)
process. The owl and its scientific guardians were a new and troubling force
in the management of the national forests.
Just as ominous were reforms that further bolstered the forces for wildlife
protection. Two federal laws strengthened the mandate that federal agencies
protect vulnerable species. Passed in 1974, the Sikes Act required that federal
agencies provide protection to any species listed as threatened, endangered
or rare by a state agency. The following year, at the behest of the Endangered
Species Task Force, the spotted owl was listed as threatened by the Oregon
Game Commission. Although some argued that this was an administrative
list that did not have the weight of law, because of the Sikes Act, federal
agencies responded as if it did.32
Of even greater importance for the Forest Service was the passage of the
National Forest Management Act in 1976. Passed to overcome court prohibitions
on clear-cutting in national forests, the NFMA also gave the forest industry
“departures,” an exception to allow accelerated harvest rates above what was
considered sustainable—a section of the law designed with rapid cutting of oldgrowth in mind. But Congress placated environmentalists, too, by requiring that
forest planning protect plant and species diversity.33 This became the key
obstacle in preventing the regular use of departures.
The regulations that implemented the NFMA were crucial to foiling
old-growth clear-cutting and expanding the power of the scientists.
Environmental groups did not trust the Service to write the regulations, and
Senator Lee Metcalf of Montana inserted an unprecedented requirement to
create a “Committee of Scientists” to oversee the process.34 The Committee
was composed of seven scientists with different areas of expertise and
chaired by Arthur Cooper from the Forestry Department at North Carolina
State University, Raleigh. Although their role was originally envisioned to
simply review regulation language written by the Service’s staff, the scientists
wrote extensive sections of the draft. The Service’s staff under Rex Hartgraves
set up a close working relationship with the Committee, and found the input
from the Committee essential in crafting the final regulations.35
The wildlife biologist selected for the Committee had a profound influence
on the regulations. William Webb was an emeritus professor from the State
University of New York’s School of Forestry with a fondness for exclamation
points. He seemed like a conservative choice. Webb had been a consultant on
a presidential advisory committee that had advocated rapid liquidation of oldgrowth forests and his recent research on eastern forests found that most songbirds had adapted easily to clear-cutting.36 But Webb became the chief spokesman for the Service’s biologists. He believed the NFMA’s diversity language
could advance the cause of saving wildlife. He complained that the Service
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had traditionally given “non-timber values of the forest a minor place … . Now
there is a different direction!” As Webb read the NFMA, Congress intended that
“the planning process starts with the assumption that all resources of the forest
are equal in value.” The Service was “no longer to maximize timber production,
but to manage public lands for public benefit.”37
Webb was particularly concerned about providing protection for species
that were losing habitat. He wanted to prevent these “preendangered”
species from being listed under the ESA “because [Forest Service] management
programs … are gradually eliminating significant habitat.” Having consulted
with Forsman previously, he was thinking specifically of the precarious situation for old growth habitat and the spotted owl. He spent the next six
months searching for the proper language to cover such species in the
regulations.38
The “obscure clause” that emerged from Webb’s search, as Jack Ward
Thomas concluded, “shook the agency” more than any other legislative or regulatory requirement in its history. It boiled down to two words, “viable populations.” The Service, Webb wrote, had to maintain viable populations of all
species in the national forests. The term “viable populations” originally came
from microbiology and simply referred to the portion of any culture of bacteria
that was capable of growth. By the early 1960s, wildlife scientists appropriated
the phrase to refer to any population level that was capable of maintaining a
species’ existence over an extended period of time.39 By the early 1970s, scientists were tinkering with models, particularly on commercially valuable fish
populations, to estimate what a “minimum viable population” might be,
based on a number of factors including genetics, habitat requirements, stochastic (random) events, and catastrophes.40 These estimates were rough hypotheses
and lacked a firm technical grounding.
Even before the NFMA, the Forest Service and the Fish and Wildlife Service
used the term loosely without carefully defining it. It seemed to best express
what it meant for a species to no longer be threatened or endangered.41 As
long as a species was viable without human help, it was not endangered. The
viability language became common among biologists in the Service’s Region 6.
Forest supervisors in eastern Oregon approached Thomas for help in planning
how to protect potentially hundreds of species. Developed in consultation with
more than fifty experts over several years, Thomas’s answer was to create a practical ecosystem management model for Oregon’s Blue Mountains. His advice to
foresters was not to count specific species but to focus on what they could
control: habitat. “By accounting for the habitats, the manager can account for
the wildlife” was Thomas’s logic. Service planners could hope to achieve a
viable population of a species if a sufficient portion of a forest contained suitable habitat.42 Thomas admitted that the study’s novel approach involved some
guesswork, but the Blue Mountain study was seen as a prototype of the ecosystem management planning the Service developed in the 1990s.43 Certain “indicator species” were selected whose overall success was considered a good

391

392

|

ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY 15 (JULY 2010)

indicator of the welfare of other species dependent on the same habitat. In
Region 6, the spotted owl was an indicator species for old-growth forests. It
was the proverbial canary in the coal mine whose viability was a sign of
overall old-growth ecosystem and wildlife health.
This still ill-defined concept found a home in the new regulations at the
behest of the Service’s staff. The viable population language had achieved currency throughout the Forest Service prior to 1978 through Thomas’s publications and other internal reports.44 At the same time, Dale Jones, head of
the Service Wildlife Division, supported Webb’s desire to protect “preendangered” species, and he consulted with his wildlife staff, including
Thomas, on proper regulatory language. “Viable populations” best expressed
what they wanted to achieve. Protecting viable populations, moreover, fit well
with the Service’s existing direction from Chief John McGuire (1972-1979) to
restrict management practices that might force a species to be declared endangered. After extensive discussions with Service staff in March 1978, Webb added
a requirement to the regulations that, with later revisions, required the Service
to maintain “viable populations of all existing native vertebrate species in the
planning area and to maintain and improve habitat of management indicator
species.”45 With very little debate, Webb and the Forest Service staff had
created a whole new class of protected wildlife not covered by existing federal
law. In effect, the Forest Service required of itself that it safeguard minimum
populations of every species in the national forests. While scholars have portrayed the Service as a reluctant actor in preserving species, few seem to recognize that the agency went far beyond the existing requirements of the ESA or
the NFMA’s diversity requirement of its own accord. The new regulations
became the main driver of the spotted owl controversy.46
Transplanting the “viable population” concept from the Petrie dish to forest
management was an enormous intellectual and practical undertaking. The
meaning of viability for a cell culture was obvious; for an animal in a
complex ecosystem, it was not. As Thomas envisioned it, viability simply
meant that planners should “think more broadly when considering wildlife”
and focus on saving diverse habitat. Thomas’s study established viability in
terms of the amount of habitat that forest managers provided an indicator
species, not by maintaining a specified number of a species.47 The language
in the regulations, however, did the reverse. It required measuring success by
calculating a viable number of animals and then requiring managers to
provide enough habitat to get there. The Service had to count owls and
decide if it was enough. But how many owls did it take to be viable? How
much habitat was needed to ensure viability for every species in the forest?
How did that habitat need to be distributed? Viability, Thomas believed, “was
an easy thing to discuss in theory, and an almost impossible thing to do technically.” For a species like the spotted owl that needed an area of old growth the
size of Rhode Island, the implications were vast. The forest industry may have
understood the danger, since it tried early on to eliminate the “viable
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populations” language from the regulations. But following the guidance of its
Committee of Scientists, the Service kept the wording in the final version.48
The viability issue started causing problems almost immediately. Only
scientists could calculate a viable population of spotted owls, and the Service
went looking for them. In 1980, David Soule published Conservation Biology,
which estimated genetic viability through mathematical calculations.49 In consultation with Soule, the Service concluded that they needed at least five
hundred pairs of owls whose territories were close enough to each other to
ensure enough intermixing to prevent inbreeding. The relatively immobile
spotted owls had to be carefully distributed. It was not sufficient to create isolated clusters of owls holed up only in national parks and wilderness areas
spread hundreds of miles apart. Such isolated populations became vulnerable
over time to inbreeding and stochastic events. To avoid this, the timber industry
proposed that the Service and BLM periodically swap owls between parks and
wilderness areas, an option federal officials never took seriously.50 After all,
if a species needed such help to survive, it was, by definition, endangered.
The only solution, it seemed, was to create an even distribution of owl habitats spread out like a grid throughout national forests to ensure “connectivity.”
That meant pulling old-growth out of the timber base and increasing the
number of pairs. “We were using the owl as a kind of model to try out what
[was] the genetically effective population size,” Hal Salwasser recalled.
Although five hundred pairs might be sufficient in the abstract, “the geographic
distribution of the owls is such that if you’re to keep them well distributed
throughout their entire range, you’d end up having a lot more than five
hundred pairs. You’d end up with a hundred or two hundred on every national
forest. So the owl did influence how we were thinking, but it wasn’t the only
species.” There were a host of similar species around the country that had
similar habitat issues, such as the Red Cockaded Woodpecker in the South.51
The owl’s extensive habitat needs, however, made the debate over it particularly
intense.
The battle over how much habitat to set aside for owls was fought behind the
scenes over planning between the Service’s interdisciplinary teams of experts
and the forest industry. The complex and poorly understood planning documents required by the NFMA for each national forest became the battlefield.
These plans were supposed to determine how forest lands would be used over
a ten-year period for timber, recreation, wilderness use, and wildlife. Because
of Region 6’s huge harvests, the industry poured in more resources to pick
apart every aspect of the Service’s planning than any other region. Regional
Forester, Jeff Sirmon recalled, “Region 6 became the crucible for almost everything that was in the regulations … on planning.” Sirmon had come to Region 6
in 1982 convinced that it had over-cut its lands and was determined to reduce
harvests there, but he ran into tremendous resistance from the industry.
“They just took a general approach that there shouldn’t be any reduction in
the amount of timber that should be offered.”52
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The Service tried to deal with this incredibly complex task through an
untested computer program called FORPLAN (Forest Planning). But the
program frustrated Service staff and led to accusations of biased programming
by environmentalists. Even its creator, K. Norman Johnson, agreed that the
program had an unintentional timber cutting bias. He had started with a
timber management program. Other multiple-use considerations were tacked
on to the program as “constraints.” The program had difficulty factoring in
habitat requirements and completely failed with the issue of viable populations.
Planners in each forest tried to deal with these difficulties ad hoc, but this only
led to protests by the industry of a lack of consistency in planning. Despite the
bias in favor of timber cutting, the early FORPLAN runs still showed that in
many forests, timber harvests would have to decline because extensive
acreage had to be pulled from the timber base to satisfy other multiple-use
objectives, especially wildlife habitat. 53
Dissatisfied with Region 6’s planning, the forest industry responded by
turning to its new friends in the Reagan White House to rewrite forest regulations. Ronald Reagan selected two timber industry executives, John Crowell
and Douglas MacCleery, to oversee the Forest Service in the Department of
Agriculture. In 1981, Vice President George Bush announced a new initiative
to streamline regulations, including NFMA’s. The tactic backfired. Rex
Hartgraves opposed the initiative. The original regulations, he noted, had
been drafted after eighteen hearings by the Committee of Scientists and had
wide acceptance from the key interests involved. Rewriting the regulations so
soon, he was sure, would create outrage. It did. When the proposed revisions
were published in February 1982, the environmental community, members of
the Committee of Scientists, and Congress protested. More than two thousand
individuals wrote letters, Congress held hearings, and members of Congress
demanded new regulatory hearings and an extended comment period on the
proposed changes. The administration’s changes, critics claimed, would
ramp up departures to cut old growth, weaken the commitment to interdisciplinary science teams, gut protections for wildlife and diversity, and soften
the language on viable populations by removing the requirement to maintain
viable populations of all species and improve the habitat of indicator species.54
The Service’s response to the outcry showed how much it needed its scientists for validation. The agency went back to the Committee of Scientists and
held another hearing. Hartgraves rewrote the draft, putting back in much of
the original regulation language. William Webb consulted with the Forest
Service’s wildlife biologists in Fort Collins, Colorado, Steve Mealey and Hal
Salwasser. They were heavily involved in planning and had grown concerned
that some forests had tried to meet viability requirements exclusively by stuffing species in wilderness areas as the industry had suggested. Only a welldistributed population could avoid these viability problems, they told Webb.
Webb took their advice. A viable population and its habitat, the final regulations
said, had to be well distributed throughout the planning area. Given the owl’s
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extensive acreage requirements, the new regulations virtually guaranteed that
millions of acres would have to be removed from the timber base to ensure the
genetic connectivity between owl populations.55
The timber industry realized the Reagan Administration’s gambit had been
a fiasco, and scientists were to blame. The day after the new regulations were
published on September 30, 1982, Dennis Hayward, a timber industry representative, wrote a revealing internal industry memo that accurately foretold the
future. He warned that “unless immediate action is taken, hundreds of millions
of board feet” of timber would be lost in spotted owl, old-growth reserves.
Region 6 had given its “wildlife biologists a free hand to utilize their ‘knowledge’ of what a viable population is (fine tuned by the spotted owl issue) and
to set ‘standards’ for the forests.” And given the research of Forsman and
others, the acreage requirement was sure to get bigger. Biologists, Hayward correctly concluded, were determining forest policy. What was even more alarming,
Hayward thought, was that the Service’s administrators, mostly foresters, were
as intimidated by the science as industry. Agency biologists enjoyed an aura of
authority that their bosses were reluctant to challenge.56
Forest Service leadership was reluctant to admit that it was losing its discretion to harvest timber. Ignoring the implications of the viability language Chief
Max Peterson (1979-1987) argued in late 1982 at a conference on forest ecosystems that the NFMA diversity requirements “do not require much” of the Service
other than to provide some of it. The Service’s biologists knew better. At the
same conference, Jack Ward Thomas and Hal Salwasser invoked Aldo
Leopold, noting that the NFMA’s “commitment to maintain biological diversity,
including viable populations, … is perhaps the most significant land ethic
policy undertaken by a resource management agency.” Looking to the future,
Salwasser and other biologists presented ideas that later became key elements
of ecosystem management policy. William Webb, in his presentation, exulted
that “the NFMA requires a revolution in Forest Service planning” and that all
natural resources were now on the “first team” with timber. He forecast, “The
diversity requirement makes the Forest Service responsible for ecosystem management, not timber-/range-/wildlife-/wilderness-/soil-/fish management. All of
those elements, plus dynamics, constitutes an ecosystem that requires
management.”57
There was little the industry could do about this shift. Its officials tried
through a series of threatening letters and meetings to bully Region 6 to
back down on their wildlife standards. In January 1983, at a two-day meeting
with Service officials in Portland, industry executives attacked the viable population regulations, but they were overmatched by Service scientists.58 It was an
unfamiliar position for the industry. When it came to timber management, the
industry treated the Service as might a seasoned veteran in dispensing advice
to a rookie. But the industry was ill-prepared to debate wildlife issues. “They
didn’t have their own science,” Salwasser recalled. Hayward agreed. “We did
not have a stable of good people [in biology]… . That stuff [regarding viable
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populations] was cutting edge.” The best minds on the owl issue and viable
populations either worked directly for the agency or had their research contracted by it. The industry knew trees, not wildlife.59 Its only counter was to
demand that the Service reveal in its forest plans the cost of saving the owl
in terms of jobs and timber sales. The debate was framed early on as the owl
vs. jobs simply because the industry had already lost the science argument.
The industry’s strategy ultimately boiled down to appealing its case to politicians and Reagan appointees. Its officials hoped that the high cost of saving
an endangered species would force politicians to revise the NFMA and ESA. “It
is clear that major reductions in the available [timber] land base will be made
for a myriad of wildlife species and habitat requirements,” they warned
MacCleery and Crowell. They estimated that 160,000 acres of productive
timber land would be lost on just six forests in Region 6, and another 70,000
would be lost to save the Pine Marten and Pileated Woodpecker. But the economic arguments could not change the science or the legal requirements
imposed by NFMA regulations. While MacCleery did try to get Service planners
to provide better justifications for the management requirements they included
in their plans, he did little else. Courts could overrule anything administrators
might do to contravene the law. Until the regulations or the science behind
viable populations changed, the only point to be debated was exactly how
much timber-capable land a viable population needed.60 And the environmental
movement was sure to pounce on any decision that deviated too much from the
existing science or regulations.
That reality was clearly demonstrated in the development of the Regional
Guide for the Pacific Northwest Region, which directed Region 6’s forest planning. The Guide, published in 1984, delivered less than had been promised in
protecting the spotted owl, and left the acreage requirements for them in a confused state. Given the pressure from the timber industry, it is likely the Service
wanted to avoid a clear statement of habitat need for the owl, and the Guide provided no such clarity. While it only required that a three-hundred-acre core be
maintained for owls, the Guide added confusion by instructing planners to
provide owl habitat as suggested by the endangered species task force in
1981—one thousand acres of old growth within 1.5 miles of each nest. The
Guide conceded that the one-thousand-acre recommendation was what was “currently considered necessary” for owl viability. Forest plans were, then, likely to
reserve one thousand acres for each pair, rather than the minimum three
hundred. Spotted owl research showed that a nesting pair required more than
this, but as Regional Forester Jeff Sirmon explained, the Service was hamstrung
by agreements it had with the BLM. The Service could not expand coverage
because the “Department of Interior [BLM] was not willing to move one inch
on what they considered to be the maximum that they would allow for
spotted owls.” Faced with political resistance from the BLM, the Service
chose to stay with the existing agreement between the two agencies.61
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The environmental community decided that they could do better than the
seemingly minimal standards in the Guide and its EIS.62 The National
Wildlife Federation, the Oregon Wildlife Federation, the Lane County
Audubon Society, and the Oregon Natural Resources Council appealed the
Guide to MacCleery requesting that the Service write a supplementary EIS
(SEIS) for the spotted owl. The appellants charged that the Guide failed to
provide for the diversity requirement of the NFMA as achieved by maintaining
minimum viable populations of all species. The Guide had not considered the
full influence of timber harvests on old growth and the spotted owl, nor had
the Service used new scientific research that showed the owl needed more
habitat. The petitioners were also concerned that the owls would not be well distributed in the Region 6 planning area unless habitats were coordinated
between the national forests. The Service’s current Spotted Owl Management
Plan was “little more than a collective guess” of agency and BLM biologists.
More expertise in species viability, they argued, was necessary.63
MacCleery’s decision was easier made than it looked. Environmentalists
wanted a SEIS, and, oddly enough, so did the timber industry. The industry
was betting that a SEIS with new science and a cost analysis would benefit
them. As Dennis Hayward recalled, the industry hoped the SEIS would highlight
“the impact [of saving the owl] on timber supply and jobs and county revenues
and communities in the state. That would be a balancing factor.” After weighing
the high cost of saving the owl, “politically then [the agencies] would find better
solutions.” These political pressures, however, mattered less than the poor
quality of the EIS. The Service’s legal counsel told MacCleery that the EIS
“wasn’t worth the gunpowder it would take to blow it up.” They were sure to
lose a lawsuit. Lacking supporting science for its owl plan, the Service had to
go back and try again. MacCleery reversed the Chief’s decision and ordered a
SEIS for the spotted owl on the grounds that new scientific evidence might
alter owl planning.64
The decision to write a SEIS was a watershed for the Forest Service. An
unprecedented amount of staff time and expertise was rushed in to develop a
variety of options that modeled different habitat sizes and distributions of
habitat in Region 5 (California) and 6. The interdisciplinary team was composed
of economists, ecologists, timber managers, and biologists who brought with
them a range of perspectives. As viability research was still in its infancy, its
scientists did some of the first population viability analyses that tried to take
different options and estimate the chances of owl viability at ten, fifty, and
one hundred years out. Given the pioneering nature of such estimates, biologist
Bruce Marcot built in some “fuzz” or uncertainty into the estimates. He would
not be giving his supervisors clarity but levels of confidence that the owl would
remain viable. It made them, he recalled, “extremely nervous.” They wanted to
avoid responsibility and “make it appear that it was the biology and the biologists that caused them to pick this decision.” Marcot later concluded that
“managers—like politicians, the press, the courts, and the public—often want
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Figure 4. Anger in Timber Country.

Courtesy of The Forest History Society.

As timber communities came to realize the extent to which Forest Service plans for the spotted owl
would constrain harvest, black humor about killing and eating spotted owls became commonplace
on bumper stickers and on items such as this “Owl Helper.”

clear unambiguous answers.”65 By providing his answers in terms of uncertainty, as scientists do in their research, he forced the Chief to make a hazardous decision between biological, economic and social factors. While this
seemed to give the Chief the kind of latitude to minimize the staff’s scientific
analysis, Marcot’s and the other team members’ analysis had narrowed dramatically the Service’s choices to just two, neither of them appealing. Given the regulatory mandate to preserve viable populations, accepting an option with a high
level of uncertainty about the owl’s viability could not possibly survive legal
challenge, and none of the realistic options avoided a drop in timber harvests.
The Service’s preferred Alternative F in the SEIS selected 550 habitat areas that
would remove 1,000 acres each from the timber base. Another 1,200 acres would
not have scheduled timber harvests. The 2,200 acres meant that almost 700,000
acres considered suitable for logging would not be scheduled for timber harvests. Tom Ortman, the team leader recalled, “The Chief’s staff was aghast
because here we had doubled the size of the habitat areas.”66 Team members
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complained of pressure to modify the plan to accommodate timber harvests. But
the recommendation stood. A draft SEIS was released in August 1986. “We first
protected a hundred acres,” Chief Max Peterson recalled, “and then we moved it
up to three hundred acres and finally went to a thousand acres… . We had all
kinds of howls from people that we were way overprotecting, that we were
moving in advance of knowing anything… . Somebody in the Pacific
Northwest said they needed a lifeboat and life jacket and I had thrown them
an anvil.”67
Despite the political fire storm that ensued, the anvil only got bigger. The
Service received 40,820 responses to the draft, almost universally condemning
the document. The industry attacked the document as “less than worthless”
claiming that it reflected poor science and shoddy workmanship.
Environmental organizations attacked the science, but from the other direction.
They pointed out that the Service itself admitted that the plan did not provide
more than a medium to low assurance of owl viability beyond fifty years. By
December 1988, as Ronald Reagan started packing his belongings to leave
the White House, environmentalists called the Service a sell-out to the
timber industry for opting for a plan that set aside 3,000 acres for owls in
Washington and between 1,500 and 2,000 acres in Oregon. The Service had
increased its commitment to owl reserves by nearly ten times what was considered the best science just ten years earlier—all this for a species that had
not yet been listed under the ESA.68 The viability language and Service scientists alone had radically altered the debate.
It still was not enough habitat for the owl if not well distributed. The Service
sacrificed some connectivity in trying to balance owl habitat needs with its
multiple-use mission, especially its commitment to protect local timber communities. Chief Dale Robertson gave his scientists a thumb-rule: owl habitat
reserves could not reduce the timber harvest by more than 5 percent. The
final option selected by Robertson in 1988 hit that number exactly. While the
Service’s preferred option provided very good short-term viability to the owl,
it gave the owl only a modest chance beyond one hundred years. Alternative
M—proposed by a panel of scientists recruited by the Audubon Society including
a Forest Service scientist—provided much better long-term viability.69 But it
took more than 600,000 additional acres out of the timber base, eliminated
1,500 more jobs, and cost the Service $32 million in revenue.70 Hal Salwasser
and his boss Robert Nelson made the appeal to Robertson to go with alternative
M rather than F. “We said, ‘you can sign this version [M] and you’ll have an
Audubon blue ribbon panel of scientists in support of you. You can sign this
one [F] and we’re going tell that you need to disclose that this has only a 50
percent likelihood of having the owls around in a hundred years.’” Given the
incredible political pressure brought to bear on Robertson, he opted to take
some risk with the owl and rejected the Audubon plan. Robertson’s decision
was portrayed by environmentalists as a sellout to industry, but that image
overlooks just how limited was the industry’s “victory.” It temporarily avoided
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Figure 5. The Scientists Take Charge.

USDA Forest Service photo, courtesy of The Forest History Society.

In July 1990, the Interagency Scientific Committee posed for this photo in the Forest Service
chief’s conference room, Washington, D.C. Scientists had reached an unprecedented level of influence in the Service. From left: Eric D. Forsman, E. Charles Meslow, Barry R. Noon, Jared Verner,
Jack Ward Thomas, Joseph B. Lint.

massive timber cuts, but Robertson’s decision implicitly conceded that the
science of saving the owl would eventually trump economic need. He had to
promise that the decision would be reviewed every five years and adjusted as
necessary to maintain owl viability.71 That all he could give timber communities
was a few more years of decent timber harvests was a testament to how science
had constrained his discretion.
Robertson never made the mistake of overruling science again. His already
limited discretion was wiped out in a series of court rulings that favored environmental groups and forced federal agencies to provide more aggressive protection
to the owl and other old-growth species. The Fish and Wildlife Service was essentially ordered by the courts to declare the owl a threatened species in 1989, and
the BLM lost in court when it tried to withdraw from interagency planning to save
the owl. Judge William Dwyer rejected the Service’s SEIS and later ordered the
Forest Service to develop a plan to meet its mandate to maintain viable populations of all old-growth species, not just the owl. That order virtually mandated
an ecosystem management approach to Pacific Northwest forests. Robertson
responded by recruiting Jack Ward Thomas as the head of the Interagency
Scientific Committee (ISC). He gave its scientists free rein to design a management plan to save the owl. As Salwasser saw it, the ISC was the birth of agency
scientists as “public policy strategists.”72
Robertson decided that he had to remake the agency and put scientists on an
equal footing with foresters. The twin controversies of clear-cutting and what he
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called “the real driver,” endangered species protection as enforced by
environmental litigation, pushed him to an extraordinary conclusion. “I had
decided … [that] I had to get out of the clearcutting business.” “You couldn’t
overlook the conclusion that multiple use management forestry that the
Forest Service was practicing was creating endangered species … . The
National Forest Management Act basically said we were to manage the national
forests for all viable populations of species, and obviously we were falling short
on that.”73 The Service needed a new environmentally attuned management
philosophy.
Just because he had come to that conclusion, Robertson knew, did not mean
much if he did not have the support of the Service, the Department of
Agriculture, and the White House. “You can’t tell people to stop breathing
without giving them an alternative… . I had that grand scheme in my
mind; we came out with New Perspectives, which was a pilot test.”74 New
Perspectives was rooted in the earlier ideas put forward in management
plans such as Thomas’s Blue Mountain study, and since the 1970s, many
Service staff had advocated for ecosystem management. In particular, scientists
crafting the SEIS had recommended that the statement focus on the old-growth
ecosystem rather than just the owl. Spotted owl planning, however, had sucked
up the agency’s resources, and broadening the planning to do an entire ecosystem seemed impossible.75 But when faced with this crisis, the Service chose a
new course. Headed by Hal Salwasser, New Perspectives became the trial run
for ecosystem management.
Many of the scientific ideas for New Perspectives came from informal experiments between scientists and foresters in national forests throughout the
country and from Forest Service experiments that had been going on since
the early 1970s in the H.J. Andrews Experimental Forest in Oregon under the
guidance of Jerry Franklin, a Forest Service researcher and later a professor
at the University of Washington. He was the foremost expert on old-growth
forests in the country, and he espoused a “New Forestry” to replace the clearcuts. “I guess it was the stimulation of the spotted owl crisis that brought it
[New Forestry] together—the notion that each of these pieces [of the forest]
has to be addressed as part of a whole, and that forestry really needed a new
philosophy of how to operate.” New Forestry, he claimed, was a “kinder and
gentler forestry that better accommodates ecological values, while allowing
for the extraction of commodities.”76 Franklin had always been less interested
in timber-worthy trees than the rest of the forest, the woody debris and fallen
logs that replenished the soil and provided nutrients for many species, and
the standing dead trees—snags—that provided habitat for cavity nesting birds.
Rather than cleaning up or burning away this “slash,” Franklin advocated
leaving behind a messy forest. He created migration corridors of trees for wildlife, and larger buffer strips near streams and rivers. He even advocated replanting cut-over areas with mixed species rather than a monoculture of Douglas Fir,
the traditional practice for clear-cut logging. The idea, as Bruce Marcot said,
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Figure 6. Dale Robertson.

Courtesy of The Forest History Society.

Although much criticized by environmentalists, Dale Robertson was a critical force in moving the
Forest Service away from multiple-use forestry to new initiatives in ecosystem management.

was to create a “thread through time” of the forest elements that ensured the
continuity of its ecological functions.77
The challenge for the Service was to meld Franklin’s scientific ideas with
new management practices, politics, and public input. And even though
“much of the stimulus for New Perspectives … originated with the old-growth
forest issue in the Pacific Northwest,” as Salwasser stated, the Service
needed to take advantage of similar trends elsewhere in the national
forests.78 He received funding to sponsor experimental projects on forests in
every region of the country to get scientists and land managers to develop
alternatives to clear-cutting. From these experiments, the Service drew up
four key principles to successful land management: sustainability, public participation and partnerships, integration (interdisciplinary approaches), and collaboration of all involved parties. Although the Service had been moving away
from a dominant expert model for some time, New Perspectives was an admission that the old Progressive era model that hoped to substitute expertise for
politics was not workable in this new age of litigation. A better melding of
the two was needed.79
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Figure 7. Taking Power.

Courtesy of The Forest History Society.

Appointed as Chief in 1993, Jack Ward Thomas’s promotion symbolized and solidified the influence of science at all levels of the Service.

Persuading the White House to go along with New Perspective’s ecosystem
management ideas required some luck of timing. In 1992, Robertson took advantage of George W. Bush’s floundering on environmental issues at the Rio Summit
to convince the president’s chief of staff and his friend, Clayton Yeutter, that
Bush could save his international image on environmental issues by announcing
the end of clear-cutting and the Service’s conversion to Ecosystem Management.
Bush agreed and announced the decision at the Summit. On July 28, 1992,
Robertson approved the new charter for Ecosystem Management with largely
the same key principles that had guided New Perspectives.80
As Ecosystem Management moved from pilot to policy, Jack Ward Thomas
and his team developed a working model for the Pacific Northwest.81 The
science of viable populations had come a long way and proved unassailable
when the Bush administration tried to undermine the conclusions of
Thomas’s team. Bush’s Secretary of the Interior, Manuel Lujan, reportedly blustered that “no bunch of biologists are going to determine policy for the United
States government.”82 But that is exactly what happened. Under the weight of
court orders and a mandate by President Bill Clinton, the Forest Ecosystem
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Management Assessment Team (FEMAT) developed a plan to manage oldgrowth forests and save spotted owls. In its approach and expansive review of
the environmental, economic, and social considerations inherent in managing
old-growth, the FEMAT report was a model of the Service’s ecosystem management philosophy and the basis for Clinton’s Northwest Forest Plan (NFP). The
Plan continues to govern old-growth and spotted owl management today.
The spotted owl controversy reveals how, through the environmental laws of
the 1970s, scientists had insinuated themselves into the framework of federal
environmental policy. It is rarely recognized just how much science informed
Forest Service policy, no doubt due in part to the scientists themselves, many
of whom did not understand the power they had amassed or, perhaps, they
were not willing to admit that they had long ago crossed the blurry line
between science and policy.83 This sentiment was best expressed in a report
by Thomas and others on the viability of all species in old growth. The team
expressed wonderment and exasperation at the fine mess that politicians and
bureaucrats had gotten them into. They noted the “cauldron” of laws, regulations, court cases, and decrees from politicians and bureaucrats that had
forced a blundering Forest Service into a de facto ecosystem management
policy. Strangely, they wrote, “However, it is not for scientists to determine
policy.”84 They had, of course, been doing it all along. In every aspect of the
policy cycle—agenda setting, formulation, legitimation, implementation, assessment, and reformulation—scientists and science dominated. One activist put it
best when he noted of the spotted owl story, “more than any other natural
resource controversy in recent years, this one has been shaped by scientific
research.” That research and the scientists behind it shaped the spotted owl controversy and the creation of Ecosystem Management, ending the Forest
Service’s dominant philosophy of “getting out the cut.”85
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NOTES
I would like to thank my former colleagues at Central Washington Unversity for
their help and support. I am especially indebted to Roxanne Easley who gamely
accepted her role as chief sounding board during morning coffee and as an
editor of unrivaled ability. I’d also like to thank the many people who agreed
to interviews and provided materials for my research, especially Eric
Forsman, Jack Ward Thomas, Bruce Marcot, Charlie Bruce, Dennis Hayward,

THE DICKEY BIRD SCIENTISTS TAKE CHARGE

|

Hal Salwasser, and Douglas MacCleery. Thanks also goes to the staff at the
Forest History Society. Cheryl Oakes and Steve Anderson made a research
trip to Durham most enjoyable. Finally, Dale Phipps took me up close to a
spotted owl one unforgettable morning and demonstrated how much the
people of the Pacific Northwest care about their forests.
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